Country: Poland

Years: 1945-1955

Leader: Boleslaw Bierut

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as PZPR, or Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). DPI identifies PUWP’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) elaborates, writing that “formal communist involvement in Polish politics ended when the PZPR voted to disband”. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Bierut’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 642) identifies Bierut’s ideology as leftist, writing that “[Beirut] became a communist during World War I and worked as a party organizer after the war.” Döring and Manow (2019) identify PZPR’s party family as communist/socialist. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PUWP as leftist, writing that “the disbanding of the Polish United Workers’ Party gave rise to many left-wing parties, and the fragmentation of Solidarity after 1990 led to a multiplication of right-wing parties”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1972.

Years: 1956-1969

Leader: Wladyslaw Gomulka

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as PZPR, or Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). DPI identifies PUWP’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1168) identifies Gomulka’s ideology as leftist, writing that “Gomulka returned to the leadership of the PZPR as the symbol of the ‘Polish path to socialism’”. Manzano (2017) later identifies ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 640) identifies Gomulka’s ideology as leftist, writing that “[Gomulka] became an organizer for the banned Communist Party in the 1920s and was arrested on several occasions.” Döring and Manow (2019) identify PZPR’s party family as communist/socialist. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PUWP as leftist, writing that “the disbanding of the Polish United Workers’ Party gave rise to many left-wing parties, and the fragmentation of Solidarity after 1990 led to a multiplication of right-wing parties”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1972.

Years: 1970-1979

Leader: Edward Gierek

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as PZPR, or Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). DPI identifies PUWP’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) elaborates, writing that “formal communist involvement in Polish politics ended when the PZPR voted to disband”. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PZPR’s party family as communist/socialist. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PUWP as leftist, writing that “the disbanding of the Polish United Workers’ Party gave rise to many left-wing parties, and the fragmentation of Solidarity after 1990 led to a multiplication of right-wing parties”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1972, and “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1976.

Years: 1980

Leader: Stanislaw Kania

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as PZPR, or Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). DPI identifies PUWP’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) elaborates, writing that “formal communist involvement in Polish politics ended when the PZPR voted to disband”. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 650) identifies Kania’s ideology as leftist, writing that “[Kania] joined the Communist Party in 1945 and served as an organizer of the party’s youth movement.” Döring and Manow (2019) identify PZPR’s party family as communist/socialist. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PUWP as leftist, writing that “the disbanding of the Polish United Workers’ Party gave rise to many left-wing parties, and the fragmentation of Solidarity after 1990 led to a multiplication of right-wing parties”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1980.

Years: 1981-1989

Leader: Wojciech Witold Jaruzelski

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as PZPR, or Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). DPI identifies PUWP’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) elaborates, writing that “formal communist involvement in Polish politics ended when the PZPR voted to disband”. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) writes that “Jaruzelski presented to the PZPR Central Committee a number of proposed economic and political reforms that far outstripped Mikhail Gorbachev's “restructuring” agenda for the Soviet Union. Central to their implementation, however, was a strict austerity program that included massive price increases and was bitterly opposed by the outlawed Solidarity leadership”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Jaruzelski’s ideology as leftist. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PZPR’s party family as communist/socialist. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PUWP as leftist, writing that “the disbanding of the Polish United Workers’ Party gave rise to many left-wing parties, and the fragmentation of Solidarity after 1990 led to a multiplication of right-wing parties”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1980 and “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1985.

Years: 1990-1994

Leader: Lech Walesa

Ideology: right

Description: CHISOLS identifies Walesa’s party as Solidarity. World Statesmen (2019) identifies Walesa as “non-party”. Webb (1992: 168) identifies Walesa as rightist, writing that “President Walesa has sworn to keep faith with the IMF by continuing the essential programme of privatization and tightly restricted public spending.” Pelczynski & Kowalski (1990: 354) also identify Walesa as rightist, writing that “the other [citizen’s committee], called the Lodz Citizens’ Alliance, was closer to Walesa’s conception and was a conglomerate of right-wing political parties and Solidarity splinter groups.” Tworzecki (1996: 406) identifies Walesa as rightist, writing that “in addition to Walesa, right-of-centre voters were offered the choice of Hanna Gronkiewicz-Walts, the head of the Central Bank, Jan Olszewski, the leader of the Movement for the Republic (RdR). Pienkos (2001: 437) writes that “Once the SLD became the main party of the moderate democratic left, it was able to crowd out the Solidarity parties and force them over to the political right, despite the inclinations of many city and rural working people of modest means to have opted for a welfare state oriented Christian Democratic labor party of the populist type that Walesa and others liked to talk about. Moreover, the move to the right (so goes the third view) simply placed the various Solidarity forces at odds with the general orientation of most of the Polish electorate, which continues to have a social democratic political outlook. By thus moving to the right and vacating the moderate left, the Solidarity forces have largely sacrificed much of their potential support base to their opponents.” Zubek (1997: 111) writes that “after winning the presidency in 1990, Walesa attempted to continue to move between Left and Right. Although the post-Solidarity Right helped him to win the presidency, he began to distance himself from this faction. He was ideologically opposed to these nationalistic true believers, wishing to ally himself with the Right's more moderate Christian-democratic centrists. In 1991 Walesa allied himself with a small regional party of Gdansk economic liberals known as the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KL-D).” Chodakiewicz (2009: 109) writes that “Walesa attempted to be everything for everyone. A rightist one evening, he supported the left the following morning, and then he would invariably stress his centrism.” Osiatynski (1995: 36) writes that “Walesa’s steady drift from center to right is one of the most significant political phenomena of the past five years. I do not believe that the polarization of Polish parties was Walesa’s intention. He is, by nature, a centrist politician.” Silber (1993) writes that Walesa formed his own political party, the Non-Party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (Bezpartyjny Bloc Wspierania Reform), in 1993, and that he condemned the country’s “leftist configurations.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center” (-0.321) in 1989, “Center” (-0.231) in 1991, and “Center-right” (0.677) in 1993. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify leader party’s cohesion as “Some visible disagreement” in 1989, “a high level of visible disagreement” in 1991, and “negligible visible disageement” in 1993.

Years: 1995-2004

Leader: Aleksander Kwasniewski

Ideology: left

Description: CHISOLS identifies Kwasniewski’s party affiliation as SdRP froom 1995 to 1998 and SLD from 1994 to 2004. DPI identifies SLD’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1170) elaborates, writing that “the balloting of September 19, 1993, yielded a pronounced swing to the left, with the Democratic Left Alliance (*Sojusz Lewicy Democratycznej*—SLD) winning 37 percent of the legislative seats”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms SLD to be leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1176) further confirms Kwasniewski to be a leftist, writing that “in February 2013 Kwaśniewski created a new center-left political movement, Europa Plus, with several small parties to challenge the recent dominance of the PO and PiS”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Kwasniewski’s ideology as leftist. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify SLD’s support-oppose welfare score as 4 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify SLD’s party family as social democracy. Hass (2006: 1092) identifies SLD as leftist, writing that “SLD began as an alliance of social-democratic parties led by the Social-Democratic Party of Poland (Socjal-Demokracja Rzecspolpolita Polskiego; SdRP). The heir to the Communist party, SdRP and SLD threw off the old image of Soviet Communism and embraced a more Western social-democratic image, including a sleeker, younger, Western-looking presidential candidate (Kwasniewski) in 1995. While critical of radical shock therapy in the 1990s, SLD did support pro-market reforms following a more gradual approach, which Poland eventually adopted. SLD supports a regulatory state in the economy, multiparty liberal democracy, and an active state role in welfare and other social defenses, although it does not go so far as to support large subsidies as some agricultural parties do. … Throughout the 1990s the SLD moved to capture the center ground. This was made possible by weakness of parties to the left—most leftist parties are either very marginal, radical Socialist parties, or agricultural parties such as the PSL—and the collapse of the Solidarity alliances to the center-right. Interestingly, SLD’s center-left position resembled the change in the British Labor Party under Tony Blair (“New Labor,” which rejected many of its historically Socialist programs, such as nationalization of industry).” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center” (-0.256) in 1997, “Center” (-0.256) in 2001. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify leader party’s cohesion as “Some visible disagreement” in 1997 and “Negligible visible disagreement” in 2001.

Years: 2005-2009

Leader: Lech Aleksander Kaczynski

Ideology: left

Description: CHISOLS identifies Kaczynski’s party as PiS. DPI identifies PiS’s ideology as rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1171) elaborates, writing that “the plurality achieved by the rightist PiS surprised observers across Europe”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms PiS to be rightist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Kaczynski’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 15 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Law and Justice (PiS) as 2.9. Norris (2020: 15) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “parties using populist rhetoric fall across the economic spectrum, for example, Poland’s Law and Justice party (in common with many Eastern European populist parties) is socialist towards the economy and welfare state but highly traditional in its social values”. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify PiS’s support-oppose welfare score as approximately 3.5 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PiS’s party family as conservative. Gwiazda (2008: 761) identifies PiS as social-conservative, writing that “the social-conservative PiS advocates a strong state, a traditional social order, rigorous law and order principles, and declared the fight against crime and corruption as priorities.” Millard (2007: 213) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “In the last stages of the parliamentary campaign, PiS benefited from a shift in the Kaczyński's strategy. With no serious challenge from the left … PiS concentrated on attacking PO. Lech Kaczyński posed a stark choice between PO's ‘liberal Poland’, serving the rich, and PiS's ‘social’ or ‘solidary’ Poland. PiS stressed concern for the poor, promising to end the scandal of ‘hungry children’ and opposing the regressive implications of PO's flat tax.” Millard (2007: 213) also identifies Kaczynski as leftist, writing that “Kaczyński also reaffirmed PiS's position as ‘followers of an active role for the state in the economy’”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center” (0.089) in 2005, and “Center” (0.355) in 2007. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify leader party’s cohesion as “Negligible visible disagreement” in 2005 and “Virtually no visible disagreement” in 2007. Funke et. al (2020) code Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski as “right-wing populist,” although profile states, “Economic grievances are not at the center of their discourse.” Kulesza (2013) states that PiS’s election platform in 2015 included “change in economic policy consisting of economic patriotism, through weakening the position of the banks and multinational companies” and “introducing the highest social transfer since 1989 (announcement of lowering the retirement age, financial support for families with more than one child called the 500+ program, increasing the threshold before which people have to pay tax; the introduction of a minimum hourly wage, etc.)” Ciobanu (2021) describes proposals made by the PiS to appeal to lower-class Polish voters by pursuing redistributive social policies, including restructuring the tax system to divert money from the rich to the low/middle class population, and increasing government spending on healthcare.

Years: 2010-2014

Leader: Bronislaw Maria Komorowski

Ideology: right

Description: Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1177) identifies Komorowski’s ideology as the Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*—PO), writing that “The PD supported the PO's Bronisław Komorowski in both rounds of the 2010 presidential elections”. DPI identifies PO’s ideology as centrist, but its source Lansford (2015) only identifies Tusk’s coalition government as centrist, writing “Donald Tusk formed a centrist government on November 16, 2007 comprising the PO and the PSL”. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1171) elaborates, writing that “the coalition crisis endured for several weeks, prompting a PiS meeting with its rival, the center-right PO”. Armingeon et al. (2018) confirm PO’s ideology as rightist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Komorowski’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 15 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Civic Platform (PO) as 7.7. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify PO’s support-oppose welfare score as approximately 6.5 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PO’s party family as conservative. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PO as rightist, writing that “the party favors conservative economic policies such as increased privatization and reduced power for labor unions”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.544) in 2007, and “Center-right” (0.544) in 2011.

Years: 2015-2020

Leader: Andrzej Sebastian Duda

Ideology: leftist

Description: World Statesmen identifies party as PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice, national conservative, populist, national clericalism, Eurosceptic, est. 13 June 2001). The Economist (2020) states, “Andrej Duda, Poland’s president, who hails from the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party (though he formally left it after being elected president in 2015). Lz (2015) confirms this, stating “President-elect Andrzej Duda resigned from membership of the Law and Justice party.” DPI identifies PiS as centrist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1171) elaborates, writing that “the plurality achieved by the rightist PiS surprised observers across Europe”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms PiS to be rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2019) identifies Morawiecki’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 15 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Law and Justice (PiS) as 2.9. Norris (2020: 15) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “parties using populist rhetoric fall across the economic spectrum, for example, Poland’s Law and Justice party (in common with many Eastern European populist parties) is socialist towards the economy and welfare state but highly traditional in its social values”. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify PiS’s support-oppose welfare score as approximately 3.5 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PiS’s party family as conservative. Gwiazda (2008: 761) identifies PiS as social-conservative, writing that “the social-conservative PiS advocates a strong state, a traditional social order, rigorous law and order principles, and declared the fight against crime and corruption as priorities.” Millard (2007: 213) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “In the last stages of the parliamentary campaign, PiS benefited from a shift in the Kaczyński's strategy. With no serious challenge from the left … PiS concentrated on attacking PO. Lech Kaczyński posed a stark choice between PO's ‘liberal Poland’, serving the rich, and PiS's ‘social’ or ‘solidary’ Poland. PiS stressed concern for the poor, promising to end the scandal of ‘hungry children’ and opposing the regressive implications of PO's flat tax.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify PiS’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.778) in 2015 and “Center-left” (-0.848) in 2019. Kulesza (2013) states that PiS’s election platform in 2015 included “change in economic policy consisting of economic patriotism, through weakening the position of the banks and multinational companies” and “introducing the highest social transfer since 1989 (announcement of lowering the retirement age, financial support for families with more than one child called the 500+ program, increasing the threshold before which people have to pay tax; the introduction of a minimum hourly wage, etc.)” Ciobanu (2021) describes proposals made by the PiS to appeal to lower-class Polish voters by pursuing redistributive social policies, including restructuring the tax system to divert money from the rich to the low/middle class population, and increasing government spending on healthcare.

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